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Abstract
When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that
she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good,
in the sense that their preferences are closely aligned to the policy maker’s
preferences, and some advisers are bad. Recently, some scholars have argued
that the policy maker’s power to replace her adviser induces the adviser to act
more in line with the policy maker’s interests. The idea is that the adviser’s
desire to put a stamp on future policy reduces his incentive to manipulate
information. This paper shows that the policy maker’s power to replace her
adviser may harm her. The reason is that this power may have an adverse
effect on the behavior of good advisers.
JEL classification: D78; D82; D83
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1 Introduction
The consequences of many policies are complicated and difficult to foresee. To
reduce the chances of making wrong decisions, policy makers need information.
Policy makers often lack time and expertise to collect information themselves. For
this reason, they have to rely on others. A serious problem is that agents who have
information about policy consequences are usually those who have a vested interest
in the outcome (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986). For example, it is very likely that army
officers are much better informed about the pros and cons of alternative weapon
systems than policy makers. This does not always mean, however, that officers’
recommendations concerning weapon systems are in policy makers’ interests.
Asymmetric information sometimes implies that those who have the formal au-
thority to take decisions do not always actually take decisions (see Aghion and Tirole,
1997, on the distinction between formal and real authority). In the public choice
literature, it is often argued that informed players, like government bureaucracies
and interest groups, have too much influence on policy. An early contribution to this
literature is Niskanen (1971), who argues that bureaucracies are too large, because
bureaucrats are better informed than those who are supposed to oversee them (for
a survey of this literature, see Mueller, 2003).
More recently, scholars have argued that the power of informed parties should
not be exaggerated. One argument in this debate revolves around reputation. In
general, policy makers and information providers do no meet once, but several times.
An important implication is that the policy maker can punish information providers
who have manipulated information. One obvious punishment is firing the adviser.
Bendor et al. (2001, p. 256), for example, argues that “if the subordinate cheats (say
by exploiting the discretion given to him), then the boss might retaliate by seizing
control in the next period.” Wittman (1995, p. 104-105) also emphasizes that the
relationship between a policy maker (in his book, Congress) and the information
provider (the bureaucracy) should not be modeled as a one shot game. He argues
that the power of the bureaucracy is limited, because their ongoing relationship
allows the principal to act conditional on past outcomes. Lupia and McCubbins
(1994, p. 105) also mention damage of reputation as a reason why an informed
party may refrain from manipulating information. It is striking that Bendor et al.
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(2001), Lupia and McCubbins (1994), and Wittman (1995) all mention reputational
concerns as a reason why information providers may act in line with the principal’s
interests, but that neither of them actually shows that this is actually the case. Or
as Bendor et al. (2001) put it “The preceding was a “free” application of the theory
of repeated games to delegation issues.”
This paper analyzes a simple two-period model of a policy maker (she) and an
adviser (he) to identify the conditions under which the policy maker’s power to
replace her adviser induces the adviser to act (more) in line with her interests. In
each period, the policy maker makes a decision on a project, and an adviser gives a
recommendation about the project. The policy maker has incomplete information
about the adviser’s preferences. There are good and bad advisers, in the sense that
the preferences of good advisers are closer to the preferences of the policy maker than
the preferences of bad advisers.1. At the end of period 1, the policy maker can replace
her adviser. This power creates reputational concerns.2 To put a stamp on future
policy, an adviser wants to be re-appointed. We show that reputational concerns
often induce bad advisers to act more in line with the policy maker’s interests. This
is the benefit of reputational concerns. However, reputational concerns may induce
good advisers to act less in line with the policy maker’s interests. This is a cost of
reputational concerns. We show that the cost may exceed the benefit. It is even
possible that reputational concerns hamper communication. Overall, our analysis
shows that the policy maker’s power to replace her adviser does not always help her
to keep control of her adviser.
Our paper is related to the game-theoretical literature on building and main-
taining a reputation. An early contribution to this literature is Kreps and Wilson
(1982), who study a long-run incumbent firm can build a reputation for playing
tough against potential entrants. A key feature of their study is that the long-run
firm can be tough or weak. In the same spirit, Persson and Tabellini (1990) describe
how a central banker can build a reputation for always fighting inflation. They as-
sume that agents have incomplete information about the weight the central banker
1Dur and Swank (forthcoming) show that the effort an adviser puts in collecting information
depends on his preferences. This paper does not deal with information collection. Throughout, we
assume that advisers possess information.
2Suurmond, Swank and Visser (2004) analyze a model in which advisers differ in ability rather
than preferences. In their model, an adviser’s reputation refers to the probability that the adviser
is able.
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gives to fighting inflation relative to boosting economic growth. We follow this lit-
erature in that incomplete information about an agent’s preferences is an essential
feature of our model.
In many studies on reputation effects, reputation is good for the long-run player.
However, recently, Ely and Välimäki (2003) show that reputation can be bad. Im-
portant for this result is that reputational concerns may lead the good type long-run
player to take an action that is harmful for both himself and the short-run player.
The reason for this action is a fear of being perceived as a bad type. Reputation is
bad if, in response to this action the short-run player decides not to participate. In
our model, the behavior of the good type adviser also plays an essential role. His
desire to put a stamp on future policy may induce him to act against the policy
maker’s interest. The policy maker, in turn may respond by ignoring her adviser’s
recommendation.
We depart frommost literature on reputation effects in that we study a principal-
agent model. In Ely and Välimäki (2003), for example, the agents are a seller and
buyers. These agents do not have a hierarchical relationship. An important feature
of our model is that the principal can replace the agent. In this respect, our model
builds on studies that analyze how well elections help voters to control office holders
(see e.g., Barro, 1973, Ferejohn, 1986, and Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997),
but deviates from Morris (2001). The basic insight these studies offer is that the
possibility to send office holders home helps voters to control them. We show that
this result does not carry over to a policy maker-adviser setting. More generally,
we identify the conditions under which the policy maker benefits from having the
power of replacing her adviser.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 contains an analysis of a simple example. In Section 4, we analyze the
more general model. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a two-period model, t = {1, 2}. In each period, a policy maker has to
make a decision on a public project, Xt. There are two alternatives: the project
is implemented, Xt = 1 or the status quo is maintained, Xt = 0. An implemented
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project yields a payoff to the policy maker equal to:
UPt (Xt = 1) = p+ µt
The parameter p denotes the policy maker’s predisposition towards the project.
Throughout, we assume that p > 0.3 The term µt reflects that the consequences of
the project are uncertain. We assume that µt is drawn from a uniform distribution
function with µt ∈ [−h, h]. Moreover, we assume that µ1 and µ2 are independent of
each other. We normalize by zero the payoff to the policy maker when she preserves
the status quo (UPt (Xt = 0) = 0). Clearly, if the policy maker could observe µt, she
would preferXt = 1 toXt = 0 if µt > −p. However, we assume that the policy maker
does not observe µt. Since p > 0, without further information about µt, the policy
maker chooses Xt = 1. To ensure that our model describes an interesting situation,
we assume that p − h < 0. The implication is that without further information
about µt the policy maker runs the risk of making a wrong decision on the project.
In each period the policy maker can hire one adviser. The hired adviser observes
µt. On the basis of the adviser’s preferences, a, two types of advisers can be distin-
guished. The first type is relatively biased towards preserving the status quo. The
preferences of advisers of this type are represented by:
Uat (Xt = 1) = a+ µt
Advisers of the second type are relatively biased towards implementation:
Uat (Xt = 1) = a+ µt
with a ≥ a. By normalization, the payoff to any adviser equals zero when the policy
maker preserves the status quo. An essential feature of our model is that the policy
maker does not know the adviser’s type. The prior probability that a = a equals 1
2
.
This prior is common knowledge. An adviser knows his own type. Throughout, we
assume that the adviser who is relatively biased against implementation is the good
adviser from the policy maker’s point of view. That is, if the policy maker were able
to observe a, she would choose an advisor with a = a. This requires that p < a+a
2
.
3The analysis of the case that p < 0 is analogous.
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The hired adviser sends a message, mt, about the project to the policy maker.
This message is a recommendation. Two recommendations are possible: mt ∈
{Y,N}, with mt = Y denoting that the adviser recommends Xt = 1, and mt = N
denoting that the adviser recommends Xt = 0. After the policy maker has received
her adviser’s message, she makes a decision on the project. An important feature
of our model is that at the end of period 1, after the policy maker has received
the adviser’s message, the policy maker can replace her adviser. As in period 1,
the probability that a new adviser’s preferences are represented by a = a equals 1
2
.
We assume that the replacement decision is made before outcomes are observed, in
particular µ1. The description of the game is presented as below:
Table 1: The Description of the Game
Players: The policy maker P and an advisor A
Period 1
• Nature chooses µ1 ∈ [−h, h] and a ∈ {a, a}.
• A observes µ1, and sends a message m1 ∈ {Y, N}.
• P observes m1 and chooses between X1 = 0 and X1 = 1.
• P chooses whether to keep her current advisor or to replace him.
Period 2
• Nature chooses µ2 ∈ [−h, h], and if the adviser of period 1 is replaced, a ∈
{a, a}.
• A observes µ2, and sends a message m2 ∈ {Y, N}.
• P observes m2 and chooses between X2 = 0 and X2 = 1.
• Payoffs are realized.
Payoffs:
UPt (Xt = 1|µt) = p+ µt and UPt (Xt = 0) = 0. where t = 1, 2.
UAt (Xt = 1|µt) = a+ µt and UAt (Xt = 0) = 0; a ∈ {a, a}.
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A perfect Bayes equilibrium of our game is a set of strategies and posterior beliefs
that satisfy the following conditions:4 (i) In each period t, after observing mt, the
policy maker has a belief about the type of adviser who could have sent mt; (ii) In
each period, the decision made by the policy maker is optimal given her beliefs and
given the strategies of the two types of advisers; (iii) In each period, the message
sent by the adviser is optimal, given his type, and given the policy maker’s strategy;
and (iv) Beliefs are updated according to Bayes’ rule.
3 A Simple Case
To illustrate why reputational concerns may hurt the policy maker, we start with
analyzing a simple example. We assume that a = 0 and a > h. Our assumption
that p < 1
2
(a+ a) then reduces to p < 1
2
h.
Advice and policy in period 2
Consider period 2. In period 2, the adviser has no incentive to build a reputation.
Consequently, a bad adviser always recommends implementation, irrespective of µ2,
and a good adviser recommends implementation if and only if µ2 > 0. Does the
policy maker has an incentive to follow the adviser’s recommendation? Suppose that
m2 = Y . Clearly, if the policy maker were to know that a good adviser had sent
this message, it would be optimal for her to follow the adviser’s recommendation:
p+E(µ2|µ2 > 0) = p+ 12h > 0, since p > 0. If the policy maker were to know that the
bad adviser had sent m2 = Y , implementation would yield a payoff equal to p > 0.
Hence, if m2 = Y , it is a best response for the policy maker to choose X2 = 1. Now
suppose that m2 = N . The policy maker infers from m2 = N that the adviser is the
good one, as a bad one would never send m2 = N . Ignoring the recommendation,
that is choosing X1 = 1, yields a payoff: p + E(µ2|µ2 < 0) = p− 12h. Accordingly,
if p < 1
2
h, it is optimal for the policy maker to follow advice. Our assumption that
p < 1
2
(a+ a) implies that the condition for communication is always satisfied.
4Our model is a simple cheap-talk game in the spirit of Crawford and Sobel (1982). It is well-
known that this type of model always has pooling equilibria. In section 3, our focus is on the
identification of a separating equilibrium if such an equilibrium exists. In Section 4, we argue that
pooling equilibria are implausible if a separating equilibrium exists.
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The replacement decision
At the end of period 1, the policy maker can replace her adviser. Below we will
show that if m1 = N in a communicative equilibrium, then the probability that the
adviser is good is higher than the probability that the adviser is bad. In contrast, if
m1 = Y , then the probability that the adviser is bad is higher than the probability
that he is good. A direct implication is that in a communicative equilibrium, the
policy maker keeps her adviser if and only if m1 = N .
Advice and policy in period 1
Let us now analyze policy advice in period 1. Suppose that the policy maker follows
the adviser’s recommendation. Later we will check whether it is optimal for the
policy maker to do so. Consider a bad adviser. The bad adviser anticipates that if
he sends m1 = N , he will be maintained as an adviser, while if he sends m1 = Y ,
he will be replaced. Sending m1 = N , thus guarantees that the project will be
implemented in period 2. So, m1 = N yields a payoff a. Sending m1 = Y implies
that the adviser will be replaced. His payoff then equals a+µ1+ 12a+
1
4
(a+ 1
2
h). It
is easy to check that m1 = Y yields a higher payoff than m1 = N if:
µ1 > −
1
8
h− 3
4
a (1)
Equation (1) implies that if a < 7
6
h, then for some values of µ1 the bad adviser
recommends against implementation. This is the benefit of reputational concerns.
The desire to determine future policy induces a bad adviser to behave more in
accordance with the policy maker’s interest. If a ≥ 7
6
h, then reputational concerns
never lead a bad adviser to recommend X1 = 0. As in period 2, a bad adviser then
always recommends implementation.
Now consider a good adviser. Recommending implementation yields a payoff to a
good adviser equal to µ1+ 18h. Instead, recommending status quo yields
1
4
h. There-
fore, a good adviser recommends implementation if and only if µ1 > 18h. Hence,
reputational concerns induce a good adviser to recommend against implementation
for a wider range of parameters. Since we assume that p > 0, this is a cost of
reputational concerns.
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The communication condition
So far we have assumed that the policy maker follows the adviser’s recommendation.
Let us now determine under which conditions this assumption is warranted. Con-
sider first the case that the bad adviser never recommends status quo, a > 7
6
h. Then,
conditional on m1 = N , the policy maker’s payoff equals p+ 12
¡
1
8
h− h
¢
= p− 7
16
h.
The condition for communication requires that this expression is negative, implying
p < 7
16
h. Recall that without reputational concerns the condition for communication
is p < 1
2
h. Hence, in the case that a > 7
6
h the condition for communication is more
restrictive with reputational concerns than without. The reason for this result is
clear. Communication requires that p+E(µ1|m1 = N) < 0. Reputational concerns
have no effect on the behavior of a bad adviser and lead a good adviser to recom-
mend status quo more frequently. So, E (µ1 | m1 = N) is higher with reputational
concerns than without. Hence, the condition for communication becomes more re-
strictive. Now suppose that a < 7
6
h. For example suppose that a = h. From (1) we
know that then the bad adviser recommends against implementation if µ1 < −78h.
The expected value of µ1, conditional on m1 = N equals:
E (µ1 | m1 = N) = −Pr (a = a | m1 = N)
15
16
h− Pr (a = a | m1 = N) 7
16
h = −39
80
h
The implication is that the communication condition is satisfied if p < 39
80
h. Thus,
also in this case the communication constraint is more restrictive with reputational
concerns than without.
Does the policy maker benefit?
Does the policy maker benefit from her power to replace her adviser in our current
example? Above we have shown that in our example reputational concerns may
jeopardize communication. It is evident that in case communication is hampered
because of reputational concerns, reputational concerns make the policy maker worse
off. Suppose that reputational concerns do not make communication impossible. In
a static model (or in period 2), ex ante the policy maker’s payoff would be:
1
2
p+ 1
2
1
2
(p+ 1
2
h) = 3
4
p+ 1
8
h (2)
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If a > 7
6
h, then the policy maker’s payoff in period 1 equals:
1
2
p+ 1
2
7
16
µ
p+ 1
2
9
8
h
¶
=
23
32
p+ 63
512
h (3)
It is easy to verify that the expression in (2) exceeds the expression in (3). To
understand why, recall that in case a > 7
6
h, reputational concerns do not affect
the behavior of the bad adviser and induce the good adviser to recommend status
quo more often. Since p > a = 0, the good adviser recommends the status quo too
frequently from the policy maker’s point of view, even in the absence of reputational
concerns. Reputational concerns thus make things worse. Thus, if a > 7
6
h, then the
power of the policy maker to replace her adviser does not discipline him. On the
contrary, in expectations, recommendations are less in line with the policy maker’s
interest. Of course, an advantage of the power to replace the adviser is a higher
probability that the adviser is good in period 2.
Now suppose that a < 7
6
h. Then, in period 1, the policy maker’s payoff equals:
1
2
µ
15
16
(p+ 1
2
(h− 7
8
h))
¶
+
1
2
µ
7
16
µ
p+ 1
2
µ
h+ 1
8
h
¶¶¶
=
11
16
p+ 39
256
h (4)
A comparison between (2) and (4) shows that if p > 7
16
h, reputational concerns
make the policy maker better off in period 1. Now reputational concerns lead the
bad adviser to behave more in line with the policy maker’s interest.
4 The More General Model
We now turn to the more general case that p > 0, p < a < h, and a < a.
4.1 Equilibrium in the Second Period Game
At the beginning of the second period, the adviser has a commonly known reputa-
tion. Let θ denote the probability that a = a. Notice that if at the end of period 1
a new adviser is hired, then θ = 1
2
.
The second period game is a cheap talk game. In cheap talk games, there always
exist pooling equilibria. For example, if the adviser always sends m2 = N , the
best response for the policy maker is to ignore the adviser’s message. Given this
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response, the adviser has no incentive to deviate from the strategy "always send
m2 = N". Below, we will argue that if apart from pooling equilibria, a separating
equilibrium exists, the pooling equilibria are implausible. However, we first identify
the conditions under which a separating equilibrium exists.
Suppose that the policy maker follows her adviser’s message. In period 2 an
adviser has no incentive to protect his reputation. As a consequence, he only con-
siders the project payoff. Accordingly, a good adviser sends m2 = Y if and only if
µ2 > −a, and a bad adviser sends m2 = Y if and only if µ2 > −a. The expected
values of µ2, conditional on the advisers’ recommendations, directly follow from the
advisers’ strategies. It is easy to check that the expected value of µ2, conditional on
m2 = N equals:
E (µ2 | m2 = N) = −
(1− θ) (h− a)
h− θa− (1− θ) a
1
2
(h+ a)− θ(h− a)h− θa− (1− θ) a
1
2
(h+ a)
= − h
2 − θ(a2 − a2)− a2
2 (h− θa− (1− θ) a) (5)
The expected value of µ2, conditional on m2 = Y , equals
E (µ2 | m2 = Y ) =
(1− θ) (h+ a)
h+ θa+ (1− θ) a
1
2
(h− a) + θ(h+ a)h+ θa+ (1− θ) a
1
2
(h− a)
=
h2 − θ(a2 − a2)− a2
2 (h+ θa+ (1− θ) a) (6)
Now consider the policy maker. Would it be a best reply for the policy maker to
follow the adviser’s recommendation? First note that, since p > 0 andE (µ2 | m2 = Y ) >
0, it is always optimal for the policy maker to follow advice if m2 = Y . So suppose
m2 = N . Communication requires that p + E (µ2 | m2 = N) < 0. A sufficient con-
dition for this inequality is that p − 1
2
(h+ a) < 0. Hence, if it is optimal for the
policy maker to follow a good adviser’s recommendation, then it is also optimal for
her to follow advice if she does not know the type of adviser. The reason for this
result is that relative to a good adviser, a bad adviser is less likely to recommend
X2 = 0.
If the condition for communication is satisfied, then the players’ strategies de-
scribed above, and the beliefs (5) and (6) form a separating equilibrium of the
second period game. Apart from this one, there exists a separating equilibrium in
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which m2 = N serves as a recommendation for X2 = 1 and m2 = Y serves as a
recommendation for X2 = 0. However, if we assume a natural language, then the
separating equilibrium derived above is the unique separating one. Given that the
policy maker does not ignore the adviser’s message with a positive probability, it is
a best response for the adviser to recommend the project if and only if he prefers
X2 = 1 to X2 = 0. If the condition for communication is satisfied, then following
advice is the best response for the policy maker.
Is there any reason to believe that a separating equilibrium is more likely to oc-
cur than a pooling equilibrium, provided that both equilibria exist? To answer this
question, note that in a pooling equilibrium, the adviser is indifferent between send-
ing an informative message and sending an uninformative message. Furthermore,
note that the adviser and the policy maker both prefer a separating equilibrium
to a pooling one. This means that if a separating equilibrium exists, the adviser
can ensure it by sending an informative message and telling the policy maker that
he has sent an informative message. Then, the best response for the policy maker
is to follow the adviser’s recommendation. Thus, if in our game the condition for
communication is satisfied, then the pooling equilibrium is not renegotiation-proof.
4.2 Equilibrium in the Period 1 Game
Throughout this subsection, we assume that in the second period game the policy
maker follows her adviser’s recommendation, and that the adviser recommends the
project if and only if the project payoff to him exceeds zero.
The first period game is identical to the second period game except that the
adviser has a reputation to protect. Again, pooling equilibria exist. However, as
before, it can be argued that, if apart from the pooling equilibria, a separating
equilibrium exists, then the pooling equilibria are not renegotiation-proof. For this
reason, we focus on the conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium.
At the end of the first period, the policy maker can replace her adviser. Below
we will show that in a separating equilibrium a bad adviser is more likely to send
m1 = Y than a good adviser. A direct implication is that the policy maker replaces
her adviser if and only if m1 = Y .
Suppose that in period 1 the policy maker chooses to follow advice. Consider a
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bad adviser who observes µ1. Then, sending m1 = Y yields an expected payoff to
the bad adviser equal to:
a+ µ1 +
1
2
·
1
4h (h+ a)
2 +
1
2h (h+ a)
µ
a+ 1
2
(h− a)
¶¸
(7)
The last term in (7) shows that by sendingm1 = Y , the bad adviser anticipates that
in period 2 policy will be based with probability 1
2
on a good adviser’s recommenda-
tion, and with probability 1
2
on a bad adviser’s recommendation. Sending m1 = N
yields an expected payoff to the bad adviser equal to:
1
4h (h+ a)
2 (8)
Straightforward algebra shows that (7) is greater than (8) if:
µ1 > u = −a+
1
8h (a− a)
2 (9)
Equation (9) gives the cutoff value of µ for a bad adviser. A bad adviser sends
m1 = Y if and only if µ1 > µ. The last term of (9) reflects the benefits of repu-
tational concerns. The adviser’s desire for maintaining his position induces him to
recommend against the project for a wider range of µ. The extent to which repu-
tational concerns matter depends on the deviation of a from a. The larger is the
deviation of a from a, the higher is the cost of the appointment of a from a’s point
of view.
Now consider a good adviser. Like the bad adviser, a good adviser anticipates
that if he sends m1 = Y , he will be replaced. Analogous to the determination of µ,
one can show that the good adviser sends m1 = Y if and only if
µ1 > µ = −a+
1
8h (a− a)
2 (10)
Equation (10) implies that the desire to determine future policy also induces the
good adviser to send m2 = N for a wider range of parameters. Figure 1 below
diagrammatically describes our situation.
12
-p-h 0 h-a µ
Good advisor w/o RCs
Good advisor with RCs
Bad advisor with RCs
-a µ
Figure 1: When does an advisor recommend against implementation in period 1?
Note that if the policy maker follows advice and replaces her adviser if and only if
m1 = Y , then recommendations based on (9) and (10) are unique best responses for
a bad adviser and a good adviser, respectively.
So far, we have made two assumptions about the behavior of the policy maker.
First, we have assumed that the policy maker follows the adviser’s recommendation.
Second, we have assumed that the policy maker keeps her adviser if and only if
m1 = N . Consider the re-appointment decision. The strategies of the two types of
advisers imply the following posterior probabilities that the adviser is of the good
type:
θ (m1 = Y ) = Pr (a = a | m1 = Y ) = h+ a
2h+ a+ a <
1
2
(11)
θ (m1 = N) = Pr (a = a | m1 = N) = h− a
2h− a− a >
1
2
Since the policy maker prefers a good adviser to a bad one, she strictly prefers to
keep her adviser if m1 = N . Moreover, she prefers to replace her adviser if m1 = Y .
Hence, given the strategies of the two types of advisers discussed above and (11), it
is a best response for the policy maker to keep her adviser if and only if m1 = N .5
Let us now examine whether or not it is a best response for the policy maker
to follow an adviser’s recommendation in period 1. Recall that because p > 0, the
policy maker always chooses X1 = 1 if m1 = Y . If m1 = N , then the policy maker
5It is easy to verify that if the policy maker follows advice, then replacing the adviser if and only
if m1 = Y cannot be part of an equilibrium. The reason is that independent of the policy maker’s
appointment decision, the good adviser is more likely to send m1 = Y than the bad adviser.
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follows advice if p+E (µ1 | m1 = N) < 0. Using (9) and (10), one can verify that:
E (µ1 | m1 = N) =
h+ µ
h+ µ+ µ
1
2
¡
µ− h
¢
+
h+ µ
h+ µ+ µ
1
2
(µ− h)
= −
h2 − 1
2
µ2 − 1
2
µ2
h+ µ+ µ
= −
h2 − 1
2
(z − a)2 − 1
2
(z − a)2
h− a− a+ 2z with z =
1
8h (a− a)
2 (12)
Differentiating (12) with respect to z shows that E (µ1 | m1 = N) increases with z.
The implication is that reputational concerns may hamper communication. The
intuition behind this result is as follows. Reputational concerns induce both the
good and the bad adviser to recommend against implementation for a wider range
of µ1. A direct consequence is that the expected value of µ1, conditional onm1 = N ,
increases. Hence, if in the static model (or in the period 2 game), the condition for
communication is just satisfied, reputational concerns may hamper communication.
Note that E (µ1 | m1 = N) is independent of p. Hence, the higher is p (for p > 0),
the more restrictive is the condition for communication, and the more likely it is
that reputational concerns obstruct communication.
The upshot of the above discussion is that if p+E (µ1 | m1 = N) < 0 a separating
equilibrium exists, in which the policy maker follows advice, and replaces her adviser
if and only if m1 = N . Reputational concerns give an incentive to the adviser in
period 1 to send m1 = N . The condition for communication is more restrictive with
than without reputational concerns.
4.3 Are Reputational Concerns Always Good?
So far, our analysis has illuminated three effects of allowing the policy maker to
replace her adviser. First, it induces a bad adviser to send m1 = N more frequently.
Because a bad adviser sends m1 = Y too frequently from the policy maker’s point
of view, this effect is good for the policy maker. Second, reputational concerns also
lead a good adviser to send m1 = Y for a wider range of µ1. If a < p, this is bad
for the policy maker. Finally, the policy maker’s ability to replace her adviser may
increase the probability that in period 2 the adviser is good. This selection effect is
also good for the policy maker.
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We now arrive at the main result of the paper: the policy maker may suffer from
her power to replace her adviser. To make this point, we compare the policy maker’s
utility in case she can replace her adviser with her utility when she plays the second-
period game (with θ = 1
2
) twice. There are two situations in which the policy maker
suffers from her power to replace her adviser. First, below (12) we have argued that
reputational concerns may hamper communication. Clearly, in that case the policy
maker’s power to replace her adviser makes her worse off. It prevents an informed
decision in the first period. Second, the policy maker may suffer from reputational
concerns in period 1. Using the optimal strategies of the two types of advisers, we
can write the payoff to the policy maker in period 1 as:
Pr (m1 = Y )
·
p+Pr (a | m1 = Y ) 1
2
(h− a+ z) + Pr (a | m1 = Y ) 1
2
(h− a+ z)
¸
=
1
4h(2h+ a+ a− 2z)p+
1
4h
£
2h2 − 2z2 − a2 − a2 + 2z (a+ a)
¤
(13)
with z = 1
8h (a− a)
2. Without reputational concerns, the policy maker’s payoff
would be equal to (13) with z = 0. Hence, in period 1 the policy maker benefits
from reputational concerns if:
z < a+ a− p (14)
If p > a+a, then the right-hand side of (14) is negative. Since, z ≥ 0, the implication
is that in this situation the policy maker suffers from reputational concerns in period
1. The reason is that if p > a + a, then without reputational concerns X1 = 0 is
recommended too frequently. Consequently, reputational concerns are bad, because
they induce advisers to recommend X1 = 0 even more frequently. If the adverse
effects of reputational concerns dominate the positive selection effect, then the policy
maker suffers from reputational concerns. The following proposition presents our
main result.
Proposition 1 The policy maker may suffer from her power to replace her adviser.
An implication of the above proposition is that the policy maker would like to
commit herself either (i) to keeping her adviser or (ii) to always replacing her adviser.
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5 Conclusions
We have analyzed a simple two-period model of a policy maker and an adviser to
show that the policy maker’s power to replace her adviser may harm the policy
maker. On the one hand, the fear of being replaced induces a bad adviser to act
more in line with the policy maker’s interests. On the other hand, the policy maker’s
power to replace her adviser may lead a good adviser to act less in line with the
policy maker’s interests. We show that the latter effect may dominate the former.
Moreover, the latter effect may induce the policy maker to ignore policy advice.
When reputational concerns are bad, the policy maker benefits from committing
herself to always keeping her adviser.
Our results are derived from a model that is based on several restrictive as-
sumptions. Let us briefly discuss two of them. One important assumption is that
the policy maker could only consult one adviser. If the policy maker were able to
consult more advisers, a comparison of the various recommendations could reveal
information about the advisers’ types. This may have important qualitative impli-
cations for our results. Second, in our model information collection is exogenous.
Dur and Swank (forthcoming) show that advisers who are biased neither towards
status quo nor towards implementation put most effort in collecting information.
We conjecture that reputation effects weaken an adviser’s incentive to collect infor-
mation. The reason is that the desire to put a stamp on future policy induces an
adviser to make less use of information. This reduces the benefits of information,
and in turn leads an adviser to put less effort in collecting information.
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